Transfer "Tilt-Rotor Knowledge" To
"Unmanned Strategic Defense Programs"
or
Potential Applications of Tilt-Rotor Technology
by Dr. R. Don Green, Ph.D.
Introduction
This work explores possible transfers of "tilt-rotor knowledge" to "unmanned
strategic defense programs" in an effort to discover facts about the potential of "tilt-rotor technology." First--as
a service to those unfamiliar with tilt-rotor technology--the background of the emerging tilt-rotor aircraft industry is briefly
reviewed. Some attention is given to U.S.A.'s debate over tilt-rotor technology. Also, several policy research
issues are framed as questions.
Second, a general U.S.A. systems' perspective on tilt-rotor technology is presented.
Inventive "unmanned strategic defense programs" are defined independent of current U.S.A. strategic infrastructure.
Third,
some possible transfers of tilt-rotor knowledge to "unmanned strategic defense programs" are suggested in terms of relevance
to idealized strategic doctrine. Contextual comments for "unmanned strategic defense programs" are given for an example
environment given a hypothetical opposing military infrastructure.
Fourth, is a summary of facts identified in this study
concerning potential applications of tilt-rotor technology.
Fifth and last are closing remarks--given in form of premises
and conclusions--to highlight implications U.S.A.'s strategic infrastructure.
This work has not accessed closed/classified
literature. Beyond the scope of this work is measuring the potential to strengthen U.S.A.'s national competitiveness
through tilt-rotor technology.
I. U.S.A.'s Emerging Tilt-Rotor Aircraft Industry
Tilt-rotor technology is reputedly
a mature technology unique to the U.S.A. The long gestation of researching and founding the principles and uses of the
new technology has been paid for and arguably completed. Sponsored by the Department of Defense, the research and development
of tilt-rotor technology began in the mid 1950's with the XV-3 designed by Bell. This aircraft demonstrated the feasibility
of the tilt-rotor idea. Later, the XV-15 program, jointly sponsored by the Army, Navy and NASA conclusively confirmed
the validity of the tilt-rotor idea in the 1970's. These XV-15 aircraft have logged over 600 hours of flight time and
have inferred the suitability of the tilt-rotor for military missions. Now, the debated "V-22" production program would
culminate about 30 years of tilt-rotor research and development by the U.S. Government and U.S. American Industry.
The
V-22 Osprey is a tilt-rotor aircraft combining the efficient flight characteristics of a modern turboprop aircraft with the
vertical take-off and landing capabilities of a conventional helicopter. It will cruise at 275 knots, carry combat payloads
over 1,000 nautical miles, and with a flight ferry range of 2,100 nautical miles will be capable of self-deploying worldwide
without aerial refueling.
In April 1991, the Pentagon released $200 million to the U.S. Navy for development of the V-22
Osprey. The construction of ten prototype aircraft are planned. If additional funds are authorized by Congress,
i.e., to complete the ten prototype aircraft, production of the V-22 Osprey could begin by 1993. As an innovative technological
contribution to aviation, the V-22 Osprey received the Collier Trophy (May 17, 1991).
Recently, transfer of tilt-rotor
knowledge from the V-22 Osprey and its predecessors is easing development of a relatively new aircraft- the Boeing Tracer
(see Figure 1). The Tracer is a multimission tilt-rotor based and winged Unmanned Air Vehicle (winged-tilt-rotor-winged-UAV)
whose first flight is planned for late 1992. The Tracer, described below and in Tables 1 and 2, represents one of several
alternative airframe configurations for UAVs. Other alternatives will be described in a later section. The following
description is from a Boeing Tracer information sheet.
The Boeing Tracer multimission, maritime UAV system meets Navy
requirements for over-the-horizon
targeting out to 500 nm (927 km). It also
meets joint-service requirements for close-and short-range missions and
low
life-cycle costs.
Quick-change modular payloads include--
Forward-looking infrared (FLIR)
Low-light television
(LLTV)
Synthetic aperature radar
Laser designator
Data relay (for command and control)
Electronic countermeasures
(ECM)
Electronic Support measures (ESM)
Lightweight sonobuoy array (for ASW)
The Tracer's twin prop-rotors are insensitive to wind speed and
direction, giving it the
same excellent handling characteristics as the
Boeing UH-46D Sea Knight VERTREP helicopter.
Tracer is inspired by the V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor, which has
successfully completed shipboard
compatibility tests. Tracer's all-composite
construction resists corrosion and simplifies shipboard maintenance.
The innovative UAV's prop-rotors and fuselage fold to provide a
compact package for shipboard
storage, and to allow the Tracer to fit small
combatants, including DD 963 destroyers and FFG 7 guided-missile frigates.
Tracer can takeoff and land in a space less than 33 feet (10 m) square.
No special
launch/recovery equipment or special fuels are required. Launch
signatures are benign.
In developing the Tracer, Boeing has assembled a team of six aerospace
organizations fully
experienced in UAV advanced technologies and maritime
aircraft operations.
Figure 1
Tracer UAV (Source: extracted from Boeing artwork)
Table 1
Boeing Tracer Tilt-Rotor Unmanned Air Vehicle
Source: Boeing Defense
& Space Group, Helicopters Division, August 1991.
AC descriptionSingle-turbine, multimission, maritime unmanned air vehicle
(UAV) system.
Program statusTilt-Rotor UAV demonstration/validation (dem/val) phase
through early 1993.
Request for proposal (RFP) for
maritime UAV engineering and manufacturing development
(EMD) phase expected in late
1993.
CustomerU.S.Navy
User communityU.S. Navy surface combatant ships
MissionsPrimary: Over-the horizon reconnaissance, surveillance,
target acquisition,
battle-damage assessment (BDA), command
and control/data relay, anti-ship missile defense, and
electronic countermeasures
(ECM). Secondary: Support of
anti-submarine warfare (ASW), search and rescue (SAR), and
mine countermeasures.
Shipboard Little or no impact on existing shipboard operations.
compatibilityStorage,
operation, maintenance and reliability to conform to
existing available space.
Personnel No more than two additional personnel need to be added to
requirementsan
existing ship's complement.
Launch/recoveryFully automatic in day/night operations up to Sea State 5.
No catapults/launchers,
recovery nets parachute/parafoil-
recovery systems required.
FuelJP or marine diesel
Standard Mission avionics, data link, GPS receiver are included.
equipment
ReliabilityAnticipate 500 flight hours before major component
removal.
Program plans
Prototypes20 total--two to be built during dem/val and 18 during EMD
1st
flightPlanned for late 1992
Flyaway costComparable to rotary- or fixed-wing UAVs of same gross-
weight class, based
on production of 400 air vehicles, not
including sensor payloads.
Milestones
Program start1987
Proof of concept1989--Pointer tilt-rotor UAV successfully
flown
Milestone I dem/valPlanned for October 1991
Milestone II EMDPlanned for late 1993
Table 2
Boeing Tracer Tilt-Rotor Unmanned Air Vehicle
Source: Boeing Defense &
Space Group, Helicopters Division, August 1991.
Engine
ManufacturerWilliams International
ModelOne PD-8920
Max shp (kW)167 (125)
Transmissions
Max
shp (kW)167 (125)
Rotor system
Blades per hub3
Constructiongraphite/fiberglass
Diameter, ft (m)9.50 (2.90)
Disc area, ft2 (m2)141.76 (13.17)
Blade foldingmanual
Performance (at design gross wt)
Dash
speed, kts (km/hr)180+ (334+)
Best cruise speed, kts (km/h)150 (278)
Best loiter speed, kts (km/h)80 (148)
Vert ROC,
SL, fpm (m/m)360 (110)
Max ROC, SL, fpm (m/m)1,400 (427)
Service ceiling, ft (m)22,000 (6,706)
Radius of action
At
5,000 ft (1,524 m), nm (km)400+ (741+)
At 20,000 ft (6,096 m), nm (km)500+ (927+
Dimensions, external
Length, fuselage,
ft (m)14.83 (4.52)
Width, prop-rotor centers, ft (m)13.33 (4.06)
Width, prop-rotors turn, ft (m)22.83 (6.96)
Length,
stowed, ft (m)8.43 (2.57)
Width, stowed, ft (m)14.33 (4.37)
Width, horiz stabilizer, ft (m)5.67 (1.73)
Height, rotor
hub, helo mode, ft (m)3.83 (1.17)
Height, vert stabilizer, ft (m)4.00 (1.22)
Weights
Design gross, lbs (kg)1,229
(557.5)
Empty, lbs (kg)696 (315.6)
Useful load, lbs (kg)533 (241.8)
Sensor payloads
Typemodular
Stationnose
bay
Volume, ft3 (m3)4.0+ (0.113+)
Wt, 8-hr endurance, lbs (kg)100 (45.4)
Wt, 6-hr endurance, lbs (kg)200 (90.7)
Fuel
capacity
Wt, 8-hour endurance, lbs (kg)426 (193.2)
Wt, 6-hour endurance, lbs (kg)326 (147.9)
U.S.A.'s Debate Over Tilt-Rotor Technology
Now debated nationally is the U.S.A.'s prospective
policy for the emerging tilt-rotor aircraft industry. The debated problem is whether (1) the U.S.A.'s national government
ought to develop tilt-rotor aircraft through the domestic defense industry, with "spin-offs" of commercial aircraft, or (2)
instead to encourage the development of domestic or off-shore commercial aircraft while anticipating "spin-ons" of improved
and modified aircraft for the national defense. Without a systems' perspective, the problem is intractable.
Lets
digress briefly to discuss two broad alternative strategies. The first strategy, item (1) above, is for the U.S.A.'s
national government to develop tilt-rotor aircraft through the domestic defense industry, with "spin-offs" of commercial aircraft.
The second strategy, item (2) above, is instead to encourage the development of domestic or off-shore commercial aircraft
while anticipating "spin-ons" of improved and modified aircraft for the national defense.
In a scenario based on strategy
(1), the U.S.A. would develop manned or unmanned tilt-rotor aircraft to (a) enhance national security through defense while
also (b) inspiring "spin-offs" of commercial aircraft which would promote national security through global economic competition.
If these "spin-offs" are developed offshore, the U.S.A. might benefit economically from, among other things, fees derived
from knowlege transfers to offshore aircraft manufacturers. If these "spin-offs" are developed domestically, the U.S.A.
might benefit from an expanded domestic pool of transportation technologies which may satisfy domestic or offshore demand.
In
a scenario based on strategy (2), the U.S.A. would encourage the development of domestic or off-shore commercial aircraft
while anticipating "spin-ons" of improved and modified aircraft for the national defense. Although some would argue
from intuition that strategy (2) would reduce gestation costs for "spin-on" technologies, such technology so derived for the
national defense could suffer from the "late start" problem, thus reducing the effectiveness of the defense technology and
thereby increasing the gestation costs. The late start problem is that because defensive technologies usually have a
late start in the arms race in comparison with offensive deployments, impending obsolescence of defensive technology is likely.
For example, when defense initiatives follow and respond to offensive deployments, such initiatives enter an arms race a period
of time later and thus are often obsolete upon deployment. The expected useful life of a defense technology may be greater
when (a) its development is shrouded and (b) the mantle of secrecy surrounding a developing offensive technology is not opaque.
In other words, when the lag time from offensive to defensive technologies is lessened, the defensive capability is less vulnerable
to the late start problem. Thus if a system were to reach deployment in secrecy, its usefulness is likely to be less
challenged. The late start problem is relative to the effort required to construct a defense for a given offense.
For example, if the effort required to construct the defense is less than the effort to construct the offense, the offensive
strategy can be nulled, e.g., before deployment.
A comparison between strategy (1) and (2) would need to account for, among
other things, the costs of a data network providing feedback on potential "spin-ons." In view of the importance of the
late start problem, any comparison of strategy (1) and (2) must consider streams of low probability events which may intervene
or precipitate high stake consequences. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to "questionologically" compare
the alternative strategies, it is apparent that defense must prepare for sets of leveraged outcomes, i.e., sets of low risk
events with high stake lotteries.
Policy Research Issues. Of the following policy research issues which are intended to reduce
weaknesses of the debate, only the last is addressed in this paper.
A. What is the value of the tilt-rotor "research
dividend" now available to the U.S.A., and its transferable value to for example- Australia, China, Europe, Japan, or the
"U.S.S.R."?
B. What insights are implied about the V-22 given the 1988 debate over the FSX advanced fighter aircraft
project transfer to Japan?
C. What are the results of explicit comparisons of weapons or weapons' systems (e.g.,
V-22 compared with CH-53E and H-60 helicopters)? Are these comparisons sensitive to foreign policy issues and uncertainty
(e.g., very low probability and very high stake lotteries)?
D. Would U.S.A.'s "research dividend" be maximized given
the V-22 as one common aircraft for joint service use compared with a more restricted hypothetical deployment of the aircraft?
What are the foreign policy issues related to alternative missions of the V-22?
E. Given alternative inventive policies
which either ease or restrict transfers of tilt-rotor knowledge or technology to military adversaries of the U.S.A., which
transfer policies can enhance the military balance without adversely affecting the trade balance?
F. What are possible
transfers of tilt-rotor knowledge to "unmanned strategic non-defense programs?"
G. What are the advantages of tilt-rotor
technology vis-a-vis:
1. thrust vectoring via internal ducting (i.e., Harrier technology);
2. thrust vectoring
via tilt-jet technology;
3. thrust vectoring via other existing or future technology?
H. What are possible
transfers of tilt-rotor knowledge to "unmanned strategic defense programs?"
II. A U.S.A. Systems' Perspective On Tilt-Rotor Technology (General)
!!FOOTNOTE
1:Net capital value is a technical term and is related to the capital recovery factor commonly utilized in engineering economic
studies.
In a national security system, the purposefulness of tilt-rotor technology is, broadly speaking,
to yield net economic and non-economic benefits. Obviously some markets (application environments) are more conducive
to tilt-rotor aircraft. In application environments where these net benefits exceed those for competing strategies (e.g.,
alternative strategies with competing technologies), tilt-rotor technology is superior. Although it is beyond the scope
of this work to explicate the cost-risk-benefit equation, and to approximate, for example, the risk adjusted net capital value
or net benefits, it is necessary that such estimates be sensitive to, among other things, "gestation costs."
Gestation
costs are the pre-project (e.g., pre-manufacturing) costs which include, among other things, research and development costs.
For a worthy project, the gestation cost is an investment which can yield a dividend domestically or off-shore. The
domestic gestation dividend may but need not equal the off-shore gestation dividend. Consider two examples. In
a first example, assume the domestic industry lacks a competitive edge in comparison with an off-shore aircraft manufacturer.
In a second example, assume the opposite of the first example, i.e., assume the off-shore industry lacks a competitive edge
in comparison with the domestic aircraft manufacturing industry. For the first example, negotiations for transfering
knowledge about tilt-rotor would be at a disadvantage and thus the gestation dividend would likely be negative. For
the second example, because the domestic negotiator would have an advantage, a tilt-rotor knowledge transfer would be more
likely to yield a positive gestation dividend. But in either case, from a perspective of engineering economic systems,
to say whether it is better to manufacture tilt-rotor aircraft domestically or offshore would require development of "total
cost" equations which are sensitive to, among things, all relevant national security issues.
In general, the behavior or
properties of tilt-rotor technology in terms of its role(s) or function(s) within its containing whole (system) include the
following: "memory, processing and communications," e.g., logical "read or write" operations which transfer information
or data; "tracking," e.g., following a "target" like a shadow by calling on a range of sensory alternatives; vertical or horizontal
"transport," e.g., carrying cargo from a source to a destination; "stealth," e.g., substantial invisibility by any active
or passive means such as seeking cover from an enemy or using radar absorbing/cancelling coatings; "other," e.g., defensive
or offensive operations, etc.
"Unmanned Strategic Defense Programs"
Digression 1. Non-defense unmanned strategic
programs which could benefit from tilt-rotor technology include, for example, programs which manage hazardous duties.
Recall the role of manned helicopters at the disaster site of the Chernobyl nuclear reactor in the "U.S.S.R." Pilots
were exposed to high levels of radiation while they gathered data and shuttled payloads to the disaster site. Unmanned
tilt-rotor technology could be transferred to the following "hazardous duty" areas managed by non-defense unmanned strategic
programs: reconnaissance and transport in hazardous environments, transport of hazardous materials, weather studies,
geophysical surveys, border patrol and drug enforcement, etc.
Digression 2. Roughly twenty years ago, the U.S.A.
slowed its unmanned strategic space transport program, i.e., expendable launch vehicle development (cargo rockets) in favor
of re-usable space shuttlecraft. Now, the U.S.A. no longer leads the commercial launcher industry- Arianespace dominates
world launch sales. Thus the role of the U.S.A. in rocket marketing has been successfully challenged by European rocket
efforts.
Returning to our discussion of "unmanned strategic defense programs," we can visualize it as one of two strategic
branches, one each for defense and non-defense programs. Assuming the U.S.A. national policy becomes one of a delayed
military deployment of unmanned tilt-rotor technology, one could argue that if the non-defense uses discussed in Digression
1 above are pursued then spin-ons will eventually transfer unmanned tilt-rotor technology to the defense sector. An
inference from Digression 2 is that if the U.S.A. slows a promising unmanned program, a competitor or consortium will seize
the commercial opportunity and gain the competitive edge.
"Unmanned strategic defense programs" may reside in one more
of the above described environments (or their subsets). For example, the following basing modes are possible in space:
low altitude decaying orbit, high altitude non-geostationary orbit, high altitude geo-stationary orbit, lunar based, other
space based (e.g., planetary excluding earth).
Three of four strategic systems' functions--strategic information gathering,
strategic feedback and control, and strategic action mechanism--for "unmanned strategic defense programs" reside in one more
of the following media:
1. subset of media contained by divisions of the electromagnetic spectrum,
excluding
"hardwired" configurations;
2. other media, e.g., particle flow and "hardwired" configurations such as
fiber
optics, electronics, etc.
III. Some Possible Transfers of Tilt-Rotor Knowledge
To Unmanned Strategic Defense Programs
(Qualitative)
This section is a qualitative effort to produce insights about possible transfers of tilt-rotor knowledge
to unmanned strategic defense programs. Although we will draft a strategic hierarchy, this study will stop short of
constructing logically and quantitatively based questionological analysis trees. This section will yield insight into
the usefulness of tilt-rotor knowledge to our containing whole system, the national security system. First, we will
simplify/narrow our environments of interest. Second, we will briefly describe a hierarchy of strategic and sub-strategic
branches of the national security system. Third, we will identify the usefulness of tilt-rotor knowledge to the systems
represented by these branches. Fourth, we will summarize our insights about possible transfers of tilt-rotor knowledge
to unmanned strategic defense programs.
2. Strategic Hierarchy of the National Security System (brief scenario)
3. Areal Usefulness of Tilt-Rotor Knowledge (brief)
In the scenario above, we identified
six areas of national security infrastructure. The areal usefulness of tilt-rotor knowledge to these six are as follows.
1.
An "ultimate protection system" would conceivably benefit from tilt-rotor technology employed in the role of a system of national
assets. For example, information gathered by fleets or individual remote unmanned air vehicles could uniquely or redundantly
complement the information from other national assets, e.g., satellites and reconnaissance aircraft.
2. An "ultimate
deterrent system" could utilize tilt-rotor technology to improve the survivability of U.S.A.'s Triad of ICBM's, strategic
bombers, and fleet ballistic missile submarines.
3. A "measured action system" could utilize tilt-rotor technology
in sub-strategic and tactical roles for relaying real-time data, transporting cargo or personnel, or executing invasive actions,
etc.
4. An "idealized intelligence organization" could utilize tilt-rotor technology to verify arms control agreements,
for example, by remotely gathering samples or data, etc.
5. An "internal defense force" could, for example, enhance
border security, etc.
6. An "other infrastructure system," could, for example, benefit infrastructure related to
the civilian/commercial economy through surveying, minerals prospecting, transport, etc.
4. Summary of Insights About Possible Transfers of Tilt-Rotor Knowledge to unmanned strategic
defense programs.
<><>TO BE ADDED
IV. Potential Applications of Tilt-Rotor Technology
Last is a summary of facts identified
in this study concerning potential applications of tilt-rotor technology.
Alternative Missions For UAVs
UAVs could be used for:
<><>TO BE ADDED-
Alternative
Power Configurations For UAVs
<><>TO BE ADDED-
Alternative Airframe Configurations For UAVs
<><>TO BE ADDED-
V. Closing Remarks
<><>TO BE ADDED-
Acknowledgements
For the useful thoughts contained in this paper I credit my informal interactions
with affiliates of the following organizations: Foreign Policy Research Institute; Interact Institute, Philadelphia;
Dept. of Political Science, Swarthmore College; University of Pennsylvania (e.g., School of Engineering and Applied Science);
University of Utah (e.g., Dept. of Physics), U.S. Department of Defense.
R.D.G.
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