USS Indianapolis

One of W.W.II's mistakes was inadequate systems approach to teamwork. This hazarded CAPT McVay's CA-35, the famous USS INDIANAPOLIS which earlier completed its mission of delivering nuclear components to end the war with Japan.
Top Secret ULTRA, our US military intelligence code-breaking system, exposed Japanese submarine I-58 was operating in the Philippine Sea area, but CAPT McVay was not told before his ship sailed from Guam into a hazardous path where it was sunk. And he was not told at his Court Martial either because this intelligence remained classified at TS level and inaccessible until the early 1990's. Inadequate teamwork in the system of the day meant the left hand didn't know what the right hand was doing. Is the lack of communication justifiable? Our hindsight should not be too judgmental thus never say "tight lips sank at least one ship." ULTRA's secrets were kept at a cost; to calculate any benefit from secrecy or "Invisible Ink," you must measure cryptologic success. Today, in the National Cryptologic Museum, adjacent to National Security Agency, Ft. Meade, Maryland is a poster displaying a motto of the period: "The enemy wants to know what you know, keep it to yourself." In strategy of war, hierarchical considerations both protected ULTRA and what it might become and too jeopardized USS INDIANPOLIS.
Four days before USS "INDY" CA-35 departed from Guam, Japanese Commander Saichi Oba, skipper of submarine I-53, torpedoed and sank American destroyer escort USS UNDERHILL DE-682, with Kamikaze-like precision. Although CA-35 would cruise within range of Japanese submarine I-58's path, due to insufficient systematic teamwork common to that period, CAPT McVay was not informed. Later, at CAPT McVay's court martial, Japanese submarine commander Mochitsura Hashimoto testified that once he had detected USS INDIANAPOLIS, torpedo attack would have succeeded whether or not the American Cruiser was zig-zagging. Instead of accepting a Japanese Commander's opinion on the matter, consider DE-682. When this Destroyer Escort was attacked by manned Kaiten torpedoes, despite its anti-submarine capabilities and partially successful evasive tactics, it was sunk nevertheless.
Despite healthy skepticism, evidence indicates that (1) "zigging" would not have evaded pilot guided torpedoes, and (2) an escort by either destroyer (DD) or destroyer escort (DE) would have been insufficient to deter an attack on CA-35 by "Kaiten-kazes." However, any escort may have been useful to pick up or credibly signal the need to pick up survivors. Still any escort without armor, if present, may itself have become a target and if attacked, sunk. From hierarchical analysis the systems approach was inadequately applied at that time period with devastating and negative results. CA-35 was alone on a journey to gather with a main force where safety in numbers ruled the sea. Without doubt, a destroyer's mission was more than to pick up survivors even though according to some that is all a destroyer escort could have done.
In a group formation, a destroyer's role is to stand off from the main force consisting of for example a carrier escorted by cruisers and battleships. During W.W.II, usually only destroyers had sonar to search for and keep subs away from the main force. By utilizing depth charges, destroyers could sink a sub or at least compel it to remain submersed at a depth where the sub could not use its periscope to track main force elements. At the frontier of the main force, destroyers manned with observers and sensors like radar and sonar, acted as early warning for enemy threats such as aircraft, subs, etc. Destroyers formed a screen of several miles in diameter at the frontier around the main force. To threaten an element of a main force, an enemy sub skipper sought to evade screening destroyers such as by evading their sonar to penetrate the screen and subsequently attack carriers or other prize target.
Alone in the sea, CA-35 lacked a technological early warning system. Since DE-682 was sunk days earlier by I-53 rather than by I-58, even if CAPT McVay had been informed of this it would not have improved his early warning system but to speculate, might have heightened alert on board. In evaluating the threat posed by conventional unmanned anti-surface ship torpedoes, such as steam turbine driven, relevant facts include that they are very fast but followed a straight line after fired. Torpedoes could travel up to 50 miles per hour since they had two counter-rotating propellers to prevent the torpedo from losing energy by spinning in the water. Though powered by alcohol or other fuel and compressed air, complemented by water injected into the combustion exhaust which energized turbines that exhausted out the rear, a wake of bubbles was visible from the surface. Although a trained lookout on a surface ship in good weather and day light conditions could see a torpedo approaching at speeds of about 30 to 40 knots, there would not be much time to warn the Officer of the Day or "OOD" to turn away from a fast torpedo "fish." This is an evasive response tactic useful if visibility is sufficient. However the practice of following a compound zig-zag and sinuous course results in purposeful "zigging" which evades torpedoes not by evasive response so much as by raising a barrier which decreases targeting opportunity. In other words, it is not easy to know where a ship will be between every zig or zag, since a sinuous or serpentine steering tactic comes from the fact that "the wheel never stops turning." However, course changes are easily tracked by experienced submarine commanders. The submarine "CO" and other officers coordinated aiming torpedoes to cross the ships future track just when the target arrived. The ship was tracked until its course, speed, and distance were estimated without benefit of radar since it would forewarn the target ship. If the ship stayed long enough on a set course and speed it was possible to aim several torpedoes to hit the ship's estimated track, like a duck hunter aiming a shot gun ahead of a flock. The sub "CO" viewed the ship(s) by periscope and estimated distance with a visual range-finder which was not too accurate. All trained sub officers could also estimate the target's course by noting the relative "angle on the bow," the angle of the ships bow to your line of sight. That is, when the target is heading right toward the sub, the officer will see both sides of the ship equally, otherwise, the amount of which side seen revealed the ship's course. An effective sub officer can come within about 5 degrees in estimating the target's course, and therefore will know right away when the target zigs. So the sub officer then calculates a new solution for aiming and releasing torpedo fish on the target's expected track. New calculation takes time, and a sub doesn't have much time before a main force, or even a lone ship passes by since they cruised much faster than the sub. Thus typically the back part of the destroyer screen is suddenly bearing down on the sub. A sub's attack solution is only approximate but by releasing several fish each aimed at a slightly different track, in probability only one or two torpedoes may hit. Usually the CO was probably the most experienced at targeting, but other officers were by necessity and training actually very good at it also.
If the ship were zigging (changing course periodically around a basic course at random times) this targeting became much harder at least where conventional torpedoes are concerned. Thus, most surface ships zigged around their base course when they were in waters that might be inhabited by enemy subs. However, from plane geometry one can calculate an advantage a Kaiten may gain on a zigging ship since the ship's relative speed of approach or departure in comparison with the speed of torpedo is a factor given the shortest path is a straight line. Thus zigging may hazard instead of protect a ship.
Also, if fate zig's a ship the wrong direction at the wrong time, it can be sunk. For example, consider Japan's third giant battleship after Yamato and Musashi, the Shinano. Shinano was secretly converted into the world's first super aircraft carrier and recommissioned. Though unfinished--her watertight compartmentation and fire fighting equipment for the most part lacking--Shinano was under way to a remote base to avoid attack from American aircraft. Although Shinano was zigging as a precautionary measure, on the tenth day fate turned Shinano's zig into the world's largest ship sunk by a submarine. American submarine USS ARCHERFISH (SS-311) sank Japanese carrier Shinano on November 29, 1944 because she was zigging! Initially, American SS-311's CAPT reported first sighting Shinano at a course and speed vectored away from his sub at such a distance that a torpedo attack was impossible. However as chance favored America, Shinano zigged back towards our submarine and into perfect position to be sunk on Nov. 29, 1944. At the close of the war, SS-311 entered Tokyo Bay in time for the Japanese surrender ceremony conducted aboard battleship USS MISSOURI (BB-63) on September 2, 1945, and then cruised to Pearl Harbor. USS ARCHERFISH received seven battle stars and one Presidential Unit Citation for her World War II service.
In comparison with the piloted Kaiten torpedo, later development of an electric torpedo proved to be slower than fueled versions and had a smaller warhead but with sonar and able to home on a target. However, although a submarine could fire on an approaching ship, if instead the ship was going away, a slower torpedo or one out of range would never catch up. Nevertheless, any fish missing its target could potentially hazard other ships in a main force. This is especially true if the fish were of the homing or retargeting variety. Also, there was a low risk of fratricide from one ship zigging into another of a main force in low visibility. As a zigging ship sought to evade possible torpedoes, or zigged unpredictably in response to spotted torpedoes, collisions with nearby ships were a possibility. Overall however, a main force consists of elements each zigging around a base course at times determined by technical means that was on all the ships so they wouldn't zig into each other. For example in post-W.W.II timing was based upon a "computer."
In evaluating the threat posed by man-piloted Kaiten torpedoes capable of retargeting, we find CAPT McVay and USS INDIANAPOLIS fell pray to surprise attack related to Japanese innovation in technology- intelligent guidance. Overall, what was needed in W.W.II was an improvement in application of the systems approach. After all, CA-35 succeeded in a mission above all missions, that of delivering atomic bomb components which brought a decisive close to the war. Evidence is too weak to warrant court martial of any decision makers in regard to the tragic loss of men and fate of CA-35. Some compensation is due all aboard or their survivors, from federal funds. Since crew and marine detachment relied upon the Navy and Defense Department for reasonable support such as in the form of information or escort or rescue, even though there may have been valid reasons for not supplying support, the responsibility was there nevertheless.
Frightfully, in the Pacific late July 29th, 1945, Japanese submarine I-58 spotted American Navy heavy cruiser CA-35 and fired 6 torpedoes. Though crude and inhumane, Japanese Kaiten torpedoes stalked their target. Shortly after midnight, now July 30th, our research infers two of six manned self-piloted "Kaiten-kaze" torpedoes aggressively stalked and sank USS INDIANAPOLIS.
Similar to the Kamikaze "suicide bomber" aircraft, Kaiten torpedoes were individually manned and piloted. One Kaiten-kaze pilot, Michiyuki Yokoyama, went to his death on February 25, 1945 at age 23 while serving Japan in W.W.II. He died near the Philippines on the west side of Borneo. When his mother went to reclaim him which was of course impossible since his body was destroyed at sea, she received a box with a paper with the words "Bones of Michiyuki Yokoyama." But there were no bones, nor usual clips of fingernails and locks of hair normally preserved by commanders, as Kaiten pilot Yokoyama's Great Niece Sanae Kanematsu, Dr. Green's house guest of September-October 2000, explained. Kamikaze translates to "divine wind" (kami=god+kaze=wind), and the suicide torpedo, Kaiten (pronounced kite-en), translates to "turning of the heavens." Miss Kanematsu said she hates the immorality of government which put her Great Uncle to death in a suicide torpedo where the only choice was to die alone irrespective of whether he succeeded in piloting his explosive charge to its target.
Of 1,157 crew including one passenger, CAPT Edwin Crouch, a classmate of CAPT McVay's, and 39 Marines totaling 1,196 souls aboard USS INDIANAPOLIS, we count 316 Naval and Marine personnel surviving the explosive attack and subsequent five nights and four days adrift at sea before rescue. The rest of the team, we count 880, died from surprise attack wounds, drowning, shark attacks, exposure, or lack of food and water. To date, Indy CA-35's sinking is the worst sea disaster in United States naval history. Could it have been avoided while still protecting our Top Secret ULTRA and related signals secrets? Although hind sight shows CAPT McVay could have been better informed, perhaps it is only in our modern day with aide of rapid sensing and communication computers which would have guaranteed a safe voyage.
Although we infer Kaiten-kazes were utilized by Hashimoto, he and records at Kure deny use of Kaiten torpedoes against CA-35. But since two Kaitens were deployed in sinking USS UNDERHILL, it is plausible that Kaiten-kazes were deployed against USS INDIANAPOLIS. However, knowing SS-311 sank Shinano with conventional American torpedoes, one would suspect CA-35 too was unsafe from conventional Japanese torpedoes. Thus it is discomforting to hear that American submarine skipper Cdr. Glynn Donaho testified at CAPT McVay's court-martial that he could have, in 10 seconds, retargeted and nailed the INDY even if she had been zigging. Our calculations sensitive to range, velocity, and so on, corroborate Cdr. Donaho's testimony.
CAPT McVay was inadequately briefed on enemy sub activity in the region both "prior to cruising," and "while under way." Too, CA-35 was unescorted by a destroyer. If CAPT McVay's request for an escort had been granted, a destroyer may have deterred release of torpedoes by enemy subs or induced enemy subs to stay farther away. Hashimoto claimed he fired upon INDIANAPOLIS submerged at less than 1500 yards away. But if even one of several undeployed destroyer escorts from Guam had accompanied CA-35 it could have at least sensed the enemy sub at a range of 2500+ yards. Yet despite inadequate briefings, inadequate updates, and no escort, a skipper must focus on all within their power. CAPT McVay issued orders on when to zig-zag the ship's direction or suspend the tactic in low visibility, as was the practice in W.W.II. Ideally, the ship's planar vector, i.e., course and speed on the water, would be unknown to enemy craft. As seamen know, cruising out of fog or into a sudden clearing can happen without warning. When chance favors the enemy as war captains know it will from time to time, all one can do is be prepared for the worst. And in CA-35's system cycle we know from hierarchical analysis that the incident may have been avoided through increased system activity beyond CAPT McVay's control. Unfortunately the skipper became a scapegoat, court-martialed to prevent public outcry against the Navy in what Admiral Nimitz called the "navy's greatest sea disaster ever". In modern times, compensation would have been sought for families of those whom did not survive, and too for survivors. Compensation is due for failure to warn and failure to rescue in a timely fashion. Modern "signals" would have dissolved some of the problem.
Survivors know what we need to know to keep alive our seamen, soldiers, airmen, and spacemen. Such information, if institutionalized might have dissolved vulnerability of USS Cole (DDG 67) to an old tactic utilizing human pilots against US Naval defense vessels. In the least, US Congress must guarantee system learning from such tragic errors in defense since the life or death of even one patriot touches many citizens. Also, Congress demonstrated in 1973 that our American system could reverse moral misjudgments: the 1906 Brownsville incident culminated in a politically motivated hateful decision to cast many soldiers of the 25th Infantry and First Battalion out of the Army, "Discharged without honor."
Whether support for restoration of CAPT McVay's honor is based in ethnic, foreign, religious, or survivor influence makes no difference as we Americans do the right thing. House and Senate Joint Resolutions (S.J.RES.25.IS; S.J.RES.26.PCS; H.J.RES.48.IH) don't go far enough. The right thing is to restore Honor to CAPT McVay (the late Rear Admiral Charles Butler McVay, III), his crew, Marine detachment-- those whom survived and those whom died. Presidential Unit Citation is necessary but insufficient- the real way to say thank you is with money.
Therefore we call upon Representatives and Senators to express the sense of Congress as follows:
(1) the court-martial charges against then-Captain Charles Butler McVay III, United States Navy, arising from the sinking of the USS INDIANAPOLIS (CA-35) on July 30, 1945, while under his command were not morally sustainable;
(2) Captain McVay's conviction was a miscarriage of justice that led to his unjust humiliation and damage to his naval career, his unwitting personal sacrifice protected national secrets pertaining to code-breaking;
(3) the American people should now recognize Captain McVay's lack of culpability for the tragic loss of the USS INDIANAPOLIS and the lives of the men who died as a result of her sinking, and to a degree sacrificed their lives in an effort to protect national secrets pertaining to code-breaking; Captain McVay's military record should now reflect that he is exonerated for the loss of USS INDIANAPOLIS and tragic death of so many of her crew.
(4) Mr. William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States, is respectfully invited to expunge the court-martial conviction from Captain McVay's naval record.
(5) the President should award a Presidential Unit Citation not only to the final crew of the USS INDIANAPOLIS (CA-35) in recognition of the courage and fortitude displayed by the members of that crew in the face of tremendous hardship and adversity after their ship was torpedoed and sunk on July 30, 1945, but also to all crew including marine detachment serving on USS INDIANAPOLIS since first embarking on its successful mission of delivering nuclear components to end the war with Japan.